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ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Gleave
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah
84117
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT L. GLEAVE,

]

Plaintiff-Respondent,
and Cross-Appellant,

1

1
1

CITATION OF
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY

vs.
\
]
]

THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a
corporation, UTAH RAILWAY
COMPANY, a corporation,

Defendants-Appellants
and Cross-Respondents, '
1
and
THE STATE OF UTAH,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,

Case No. 20166
Case No. 20300

Consolidated Case
No. 20300

]

Defendant-Respondent.

'

Pursuant to Rule 24 (j), U^ah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Respondent Gleave refers the Court to the case of
Clarkston

v.

Wright,

N.E.2d

,

(111.

1985).

That case is so recent that it has r^ot yet appeared in the
printed reporters.

Therefore, a copyf of the "slip opinion"

is attached.
The

Clarkston

Gleave1 s opening brief.

opinion

relates

to

page

19

of

Specifically, Clarkstort sides," |n%h

OCT 2 81985
Cork, Sup-smo Ccurr Hah

the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that evidence of
failure to wear a seat belt should not be admitted with
respect to liability or damages.
Plaintiff also cites the recent case of Wassell v.
Hamblin, 493 A.2d 870 (Conn. 1985) to similar effect.
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RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED

this

Aj

day

of

1985
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys ^£©r Gleave

By:
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that four

(4)

true and correct

copies of the foregoing Citation of Supplemental Authority,
(Gleave vs. Rio Grande), was hand delivered, this
of

IvCf

'

, 1985, to the following:

E. Scott Savage, Esq.
Michael F. Richman, Esq.
Patrick J. O f Hara, Esq.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Attorneys for the Rio Grande and Utah
Railway Company
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P.O. Box 3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3400

Paul Warner, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General for the
State of Utah
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent Utah
Department of Transportation, State bf Utah
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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CHAMBERS OF
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JUSTICE

STATE OF ILLINOIS

DANIEL

P.WARD

R M . 3 0 8 3 , RICHARD J . DALEY CENTER

CHICAGO 6 0 6 0 2

October 24, 1985

Robert J. DeBry, Esq.
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Re:

Clarkson vs. Wright
Docket No. 59766

Dear Mr. DeBry:
Enclosed is the opinion in Clarkson vs.
Wright with the correct page 4 inser^ecT
Sincerely,

DPW:nk
Enclosure

Docket No. 59766-Agenda 18-November 1984,
LARRY CLARKSON, Appellant, v. WILLIAM WEIGHT,
Appellee.
JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH delivered the opinioniof the
court:
Plaintiff, Larry Clarkson, appealed from the judgment of
the circuit court of Peoria County entered upon a jury verdict in his favor against defendant, William Wright. The appellate court affirmed (121 111. App. 3d 230), and we allowed
plaintiffs petition for leave to appeal (94 Dl. 2d R. 315(a)).
The facts are adequately set forth in the opinion of the appellate court and will be stated here only to the extent (necessary to discuss the issues.
Plaintiff was injured when the automobile owned Iby his
employer and being driven by plaintiff was struck by defendant's automobile. Plaintiff brought this action seeking damages for the injuries which he alleged were caused by
defendant's negligence. Plaintiff alleged that he suffered a
fractured wrist and serious facial lacerations, and special
damages of $5,629 for medical expenses of $2,509, and lost
wages of $3,120. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in
the amount of $3,620, which was reduced by 50% to $1,810
based upon the jury's determination of the parties' comparative negligence.
Plaintiff contends that because defendant failed tol prove
that the seat belt in the automobile was in working order
and available for use the circuit court erred in admitting evidence of plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt. He arguis that
the "present Illinois rule that the seat belt defense can be
considered in mitigation of damages is unsound." (See
Mvunt v. McClellan (1968), 91 Dl. App. 2d 1.) Plaintiff and
amicus curiae, the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, argue
too that, with the adoption of comparative negligence, evidence of the failure to use a seat belt will result in a double
reduction of damages because juries will consider it both in
their comparative-negligence deliberations and will further
reduce damages to the extent which they determine |use of
the seat belt would have prevented.
Defendant contends that "consistent with principles of
equitable distribution and apportionment of loss," evidence
of plaintiffs failure to use a seat belt requires a reduction in
his damages where the failure to use a seat belt has resulted
in additional or enhanced injuries. Defendant argues that the
"overwhelming recognition of the efficacy of seat b#ts by
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both the scientific community and the courts of sistet States
supports the consideration of plaintiffs failure to wear an
available seat belt to reduce recoverable damages." [Amicus
curiae, the Illinois Defense Counsel, argues that a plaintiff is
under a duty to exercise ordinary care for his saiety and
that this "duty extends to the utilization of restraints to
avert or mitigate against the consequences of vehicular collisions." Defendant contends too that plaintiffs failure to use
a seat belt was properly admissible both on the issue of comparative negligence and plaintiffs failure to mitigate damages under the doctrine of avoidable consequences, but more
appropriately should be considered on the issue of liability.
The question whether failure to use a seat belt may be
shown in automobile personal injury litigation either as evidence of contributory negligence or as failure to mitigate
damages has been the subject of much controversy. See, e.g.,
Annot, Nonu8e of Automobile Seatbelts as EvidencelofComparative Negligence, 95 A.L.R. 3d 239 (1979); Annot, Automobile Occupant's Failure to Use Seat Belt as Corttributory
Negligence, 92 A.L.R.3d 9 (1979); Annot, N(muse\ofSeat
Belt as Failure to Mitigate Damages, 80 A.L.R. 3d 1033
(1977); Snyder, The Seat Belt as a Cause of Injury, 53 Marq.
L. Rev. 211 (1969-70); Heist, The Seat Belt Defehse-An
Exercise in Sophistry, 18 Hastings LJ. 613 (196^-67); J.
Stein, Damages and Recovery, Personal Injury and Death
Actions sec. 127 (1972); 2 M. Bender, The Seat Belt defense,
Damages in Tbrt Actions sec. 16.40 et seq. (1984).
Although this court has not previously considered the issue, the appellate court has done so on a number of occasions. The rule as stated in the opinions of the appellate
court is that the trier of fact may not consider the failure to
use seat belts on the issue of liability (Josel v. Rossi (1972), 7
SI. App. 3d 1091), but may be instructed with respect to the
failure to use seat belts on the issue of damages if there is
competent evidence to show a causal connection between
the plaintiffs failure to use an available belt and the injuries
and damages sustained. (Eichorn v. Olson (1975), 32 Bl.
App. 3d 587.) Prosser describes the relationship between
plaintiff's negligence and his duty to mitigate damages as
follows:
"Closely allied to the doctrine of contributor^ negligence is the rule of 'avoidable consequences/ whicn denies
recovery for any damages which could have been avoided
by reasonable conduct on the part of the plaintiff. Both
rest upon the same fundamental policy of making recovery
depend upon the plaintiffs proper care for the protection
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of his own interests, and both require of him obly the
standard of the reasonable man under the circumstances."
Prosser, Torts sec. 65, at 422-23 (4th ed. 1971).
We fail to perceive the value of attempting to ahalyze,
compare or reconcile the many decisions reviewed in the
authorities cited. We agree with the majority view that
failure to use a seat belt was not negligence or contributory negligence which caused the accident out of which
plaintiffs injuries arose. At most, the failure to use a seat
belt created a condition which possibly may h^ve in
creased the severity of plaintiff's injuries.
Section 12-603 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (II Rev.
Stat. 1979, ch. 95V2, par. 12-603) required the installation of two sets of seat belts in the front seat of all automobiles manufactured after 1964 and prohibited any person from operating an automobile manufactured after
1960 which is not so equipped. The statute contained no
requirement that seat belts be used until the enactment of
Public Act 83-1507 ("An Act to add Section 12-603.1 to
The Illinois Vehicle Code,' " approved January 8 1985,
effective July 1, 1985), which in pertinent part, provides:
"(a) Each driver and front seat passenger of a motor
vehicle operated on a street or highway in this Stake shall
wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat safeiy belt;
(d) A violation of this Section shall be a petty pffense
and subject to a fine not to exceed $25."
Once plaintiff suffered an injury there was, of Course,
a duty to mitigate the damages in any reasonable way
possible. That duty to mitigate damages which arose subsequent to the injury is, however, clearly distinguishable
from any duty which existed prior to the injury. Here,
there was no statutory duty to wear a seat belt and the
presence of the seat belt in the automobile did not create
the duty to wear it any more than would the presence in
the automobile of a protective helmet create a duty to
wear that. We find no authority wrhich imposed on plaintiff
the duty to anticipate and guard against defendants negligence.
We conclude that the rule, followed in a majority of the
jurisdictions which have considered the question (see
Note, The Seat Belt Defense: A Comprehensive Guide for
the Trial Lawyer and Suggested Approach for the Courts,
56 Notre Dame Law. 272, 273, n.9 (1980)), that evidence
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of failure to wear a seat belt should not be admitted with
respect to either the question of liability or damages, is a
sound one which should be followed in this jurisdiction
We note that during the pendency of this appeal the
General Assembly enacted Public Act 83—1507, which,
consistent with our holding here, contains the following
provision:
"(c) Failure to wear a seat safety belt in violation of this
Section shall not be considered evidence of negligence,
shall not limit the liability of an insurer, and shall not diminish any recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle." |Pub.
Act 83-1507, approved Jan. 8, 1985, eff. July 1, 1985.
For the reasons stated, the judgments of the appellate
and circuit courts are reversed and the cause is remanded
to the circuit court of Peoria County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgments revetsed;
cause remanded.
JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting:
I believe that the plaintiff's failure to use a seat b&t is
evidence that the jury may properly consider in determining the amount of plaintiffs damages. I, therefore] dissent.
This State has recently adopted the pure form of [comparative negligence. Therefore, in considering the peatbelt defense it is not appropriate to think in terms of contributory negligence, that is, conduct on the part of the
plaintiff which will defeat recovery. Under comparative
negligence, we must consider plaintiffs failure to u^e an
available seat belt in terms of reducing the amount df the
plaintiff's damages. Some discuss plaintiffs duty in such
situations in terms of ''mitigation of damages'' or "avoidable consequences/' We need not try to classify plaintiffs
duty. We should simply hold that plaintiffs recovery may
be diminished to the extent that his failure to use an Available seat belt contributed to his injuries.
States adhering to the contributory-negligence theory
have generally been unwilling to hold that plaintiffs failure to use a seat belt bars recovery. However, one commentator has stated: 'There is a growing body of case
authority and scholarly comment which indicates that although evidence of a failure to fasten a seat belt is inadmissible to show contributory negligence, such evidence
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should be admissible under a comparative negligence [standard/' Miller, The Seat Belt Defense Under Comparative Negligence, 12 Idaho L. Rev. 59, 60 (1975).
Also, another commentator stated:
"Jurisdictions employing the standard of comparative
negligence need not engage m any flights of intel ectual
fantasy to use the seat belt rule as a mechanism to assure
the proper apportionment of damage recoveries. By its
very nature, the concept of comparative negligence contemplates the inclusion of all relevant factors in arriving at
the appropriate amount of damages to be recovered by
each of the claimants It must be concluded, therefore, that
the advent of the comparative negligence standard, when
coupled with the refined version of the reasonably prudent
person standard, will meluctably lead to the adoption of
the seat belt rule as a significant element of the damage
apportionment equation/' Hoglund and Parsons, Caveat
Viator The Duty To Wear Seat Belts Under Comparative
Negligence Law, 50 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 14-15 (1974)
In Alms v Ribar (1981), 85 111. 2d 1, this State, by
judicial decision, abandoned the defense of contributory
negligence and adopted the principle of pure comparative
negligence. In doing so, this court made these statements:
"Under a comparative negligence standard, the parties are
allowed to recover the proportion of damages not attributable to their own fault The basic logic and fairness of such
apportionment is difficult to dispute." (Emphasis apded.)
(85 111 2d 1, 16.)
"[W]e believe that the need to deter negligent parties supports the adoption of the comparative negligence doctrine
in which each party would be liable for damages in \direct
proportion to his degree of carelessness " (Emphasis
added.) (85 111. 2d 1,18.)
4
The 'pure' form of comparative negligence is thb only
system which truly apportions damages according \to the
relative fault of the parties and, thus, achieves tot^l justice " (Emphasis added.) (85 111. 2d 1, 27.)
Thus, the principle underlying pure comparative Inegligence, as adopted in Alvis, is fairness. Damages are apportioned according to the relative fault of the parties
The parties are permitted to recover damages "not attributable to their own fault1' (Emphasis added.) 85 111. 12d 1,
16.
It therefore appears that, to be consistent with our
holding in Alms, a plaintiff should not be permitted \o recover damages brought about by his failure to wear a seat
belt if a reasonably prudent person would be expectjed to
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use a seat belt under similar circumstances.
The majority opinion notes that the act in effect jat the
time of the accident only required that automobiles be
equipped with seat belts and contained no requirement
that seat belts be used by the occupants. (111. Rev. Stat.
1979, ch. 95V2, par. 12-603.) If the statute would have
required the use of seat belts as it now does, that would
have been a reason to consider whether the plaintiff s failure to use the seat belt constituted negligence per se.
Such a statute imposes a duty on the passenger to use the
seat belt. (See Kircher, The Seat Belt Defense—State\of the
Law, 53 Marq. L. Rev. 172, 174 (1970).) The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin, in Bentzler v. Braun (1967), 34 Wis.
2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626, considered the Wisconsin statute
which only required that automobiles be equipped with
seat belts and did not require the passengers to use Ithem.
The court stated:
"While we agree with those courts that have concluded
that it is not negligent per se to fail to use seat belts where
the only statutory standard is one that requires the installation of the seat belts in the vehicle, we nevertheless conclude that there is a duty, based on the common-law standard of ordinary care, to use available seat belts
independent of any statutory mandate." (34 Wis. 3d 362,
385, 149 N.W. 2d 626, 639.)
Thus, the fact that there was no statutory duty to ^vear a
seat belt (which is noted in the majority opinion) did not
relieve the plaintiff of a common law duty to use ordinary
care. If a reasonably prudent person, under similar circumstances, would have used the available seat belt?, then
the plaintiff had a duty to do so.
The majority opinion states that the duty to mitigate
damages applies only to those damages which arise after
the injury. Under comparative negligence we have abandoned the rigid doctrines associated with contributory
negligence and the fine lines of demarcation surrounding
such doctrines. We should not attempt to continue to apply the same rigid limitations of those concepts designed
to avoid the harshness of contributory negligence when
applying the same principles under comparative negligence. The "avoidable consequences'* or "mitigation of
damages'' principles referred to in the majority opinion
were doctrines applied in jurisdictions where plaintiffs
contributory negligence was a complete defense to enable
the courts to equitably separate damages attributable to
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the plaintiffs conduct without completely defeating the
plaintiffs claim against the defendant. Under comparative negligence there is no longer a need or reason to define artificial lines or times beyond which the court cannot
consider the doctrines of avoidable consequences or mitigation of damages as a means of equitably apportioning
damages.
Dean Prosser, in discussing whether plaintiffs preinjury conduct which did not cause the accident can be considered in assessing damages, notes that "Iowa and Kansas *** have apportioned the damages, holding that the
plaintiff's recovery will be reduced to the exteni that [the
plaintiffs injuries] have been aggravated by his own antecedent negligence." Prosser continues, "This would seem
to be the better view, unless we are to place an entirely
artificial emphasis upon the moment of impactL and the
pure mechanics of causation." (Emphasis added.)
(Prosser, Torts sec. 65, at 424 (4th ed. 1971).)Iij support
of this proposition, Dean Prosser states: "This has been
applied where plaintiffs failure to use a seat belt has not
caused the collision, but has contributed to the damages
from it." Prosser, Torts sec. 65, at 424 n.75 (4th e[d. 1971).
The majority opinion is correct in noting that the question we are now considering has been the subjeci of much
controversy. I am not as sure as is the majority opinion
that the conclusion it has reached represents the majority
view in this country, especially in pure comparative-negligence jurisdictions. Some courts that have rejected the
seat-belt defense were in jurisdictions wherein contributory negligence was a defense. Some were in jurisdictions
that applied a modified form of comparative negligence.
In some cases the defense was rejected because of the
manner in which it was raised or pleaded. See Kircher,
The Seat Belt Defense—State of the Law, 53 Marq[ L. Rev.
172 (1970).
Regardless of where the numerical majority ofljurisdictions may stand on the issue, we must not lose sight of the
fact that we have only recently, in Alvis, abandoned the
artificially harsh doctrine of contributory negligence. We
have adopted in its stead the principle of pure comparative negligence based on the equitable and fair Rationale
that a party should recover for the damages caused by the
other party and should not recover for the damages he
himself has caused. We should not now adopt exceptions
to our new doctrine of comparative negligence which will
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make it a little less than "pure." Principles of law have a
way of collecting exceptions to accommodate special interests. I view the majority opinion as an exception to our
new doctrine which permits the plaintiff to recover more
than he otherwise would be entitled to under the rationale
behind the doctrine of pure comparative negligence. If,
under the facts and circumstances of the case, a reasonably prudent person would have used the available seat belt
in the automobile, and if the plaintiff received more severe injuries from the accident as a result of not wearing
the seat belt, this is information the jury has| a right to
consider in assessing damages.
The majority opinion refers to the fact thatlPublic Act
83-1507, effective July 1, 1985, provides thai failure to
wear a seat safety belt in violation of the statute shall not
be considered evidence of negligence and shall not diminish any recovery for damages. The majority opinion notes
that this statutory provision is consistent with the holding
of this opinion. We have not as yet passed on the constitutionality of Public Act 83—1507. It would appear that the
provision just referred to is inconsistent with an earlier
provision of the Act which requires each driver and frontseat passenger of a motor vehicle to wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt and makes it a petty
offense not to do so. Thus the legislature, in the Act, has
said that it is dangerous for a passenger in an automobile
not to wear a seat belt; therefore, the law requires that
front-seat passengers wear seat belts or they will be fined
for not doing so. However, if such a passenger is injured
in an accident caused by another, the amount of damages
caused by his failure to wear a seat belt (although he may
be fined) cannot be deducted from his total recovery. The
Act creates a duty on specified passengers to wear seat
belts and enforces that duty by providing a fine for the
violation. Consistency would seem to require that, in considering the question of damages, a violation of this statutory duty should at least be considered as evidence of
plaintiff's failure to act as a reasonably prudent person.
Inferentially, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in Bentzler
v. Braun, considered that failure to use available seat
belts, when the statute by its terms requires their use,
may be negligence per se. (See also Kircher, The Seat Belt
Defense-State of the Law, 53 Marq. 172, 174 (1970).) In
Spier v. Barker (1974), 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164,
363 N.Y.S.2d 916, the New York Court of Appeals noted
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that the statute of that State does not require passengers
of automobiles to wear seat belts. Therefore, plaintiffs
failure to do so would not be considered by the court to be
negligence per se. However, relying on section 65 of
Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971), which I referred to above,
the New York court held that the jury could consider
plaintiffs nonuse of a seat belt in assessing damages. The
language of Public Act 83—1507, which provides tnat the
failure to wear a seat safety belt shall not be considered
evidence of negligence, is similar to that found in statutes
requiring seat-belt installation but not their use that have
been enacted in Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Tennessee, and
Virginia. See Kircher, The Seat Belt Defense—Statue of the
Law, 53 Marq. L. Rev. 172, 176 (1970).
For the above reasons, I dissent from the opinion of
the majority of this court.
JUSTICE MORAN joins in this dissent.
JUSTICE MILLER, also dissenting:
I join in Justice Ryan's dissent insofar as th4 dissent
relates to accidents which occurred subsequent to the effective date of this court's holding in Alvis v. Ribar
(1981), 85 111. 2d 1. Because the questions have not been
presented, I would express no opinion at this time with
regard to the constitutionality of Public Act 834-1507 or
its effect on the views expressed in Justice Ryan^ dissent.
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